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IN RODUCTION

History reveals that for more than three centuries after the
Lord Proprietors of the Carolina territory appointed John Willoughby the first Chief Justice in 16701 judges in North Carolina
have not been sanctioned for misconduct in office by the traditional methods of impeachment and recall. The first public censure2 came in 1975, and the first removal from office came in 1978. s
However, it would be a grave mistake to assume that the judges in
this State for three centuries were above reproach or that they
were regarded with awe-struck reverence. Recall was never used.
Impeachment proceedings were instituted but never resulted in removal. There were methods other than the traditional methods of
impeachment and recall, however, which were used to correct
abuses by the judiciary. We will examine in this article some of the
complaints and charges against judges in North Carolina, and the
methods used in imposing or attempting to impose sanctions for
misconduct in office before and after the creation of the North
Carolina Judicial Standards Commission in 1973.
II. THE PROPRIETARY AND COLONIAL PERIOD (1663-1776)
The Lord Proprietors, beginning with the first Charter from
Charles II on March 24, 1663, governed for a period of sixty six
years.4 Chief Justice John Willoughby did not serve long after his
appointment in 1670 before an accusation was made to the Lord
Proprietors that the Chief Justice was a "person who runs himself
in many errors and praemuniresby his extrajudicial and arbitrary
proceedings to the courts." It was also charged that he refused to
grant an appeal in one case, declaring that his courts "were the
court of courts and jury of juries." History does not record
whether the accusation against Chief Justice Willoughby was true.
1. Address by the Hon. Kemp P. Battle, History of the Supreme Court (Feb.
4, 1889), 1 N.C. 835, 839 (4th Ed. 1937).
2. In re Crutchfield, 289 N.C. 597, 223 S.E.2d 822 (1975).
3. In re Peoples, 296 N.C. 109, 250 S.E.2d 890 (1978).

4. See Adams, Evaluation of Law in North Carolina, 2 N.C.L. REv. 133
(1924).

5. Battle, supra note 1, at 839-40.
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol4/iss1/1
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More serious charges were made against the Chief Justices
who followed Willoughby during the proprietary period. Christopher Gale, who in 1712 was appointed the first Chief Justice of
North Carolina as a separate province, vacated his office by going
to England. He was succeeded by Tobias Knight, who was accused
of complicity with the pirate Blackbeard but was acquitted. 6 Then
came Chief Justice Frederick Jones who unjustly detained money
paid to him in lieu of bail; his executors were forced to refund the
money."
Jurisdiction over the province was transferred by the Proprietors to the Crown in 1728 but not assumed until 1731 when George
Burrington, the Royal Governor, arrived from England. 8 The Colonial Government was marked by some stormy disputes between
the Governor and the Chief Justice, both appointed by the Crown.
When Chief Justice William Smith accused Governor Burrington
of tyrannical conduct, the Governor attempted to break the force
of the attack by writing to the Board of Trade that Smith was "a
silly, rash boy, a busy fool and an egregious sot . .. , ungrateful
perfidious scoundrel, and as much wanting in truth as
understanding."'
Other Chief Justices during the Colonial Period charged with
misconduct were William Little, voted by the lower house of the
Assembly to be guilty of oppression and extortion but who nevertheless served until his death in 1734, and Daniel Hanmer, who
was imprisoned for perjury shortly after his appointment in 1734,
serving as Chief Justice for only a few months.' ° It is a reasonable
assumption that he was removed by the Crown.
III. THE IMPEACHMENT PERIOD (1776-1973)
The first Constitution of the free State of North Carolina"'
provided for the appointment of judges to administer justice in the
new State and to "hold their offices during good behaviour."'

The

provision that judges were to serve only during good behavior and
6. Id. at 842.
7. Id.

8. Id.
9. Id. at 843.
10. Id.
11. N.C. CONST. of 1776, reprinted in 10 The Colonial Records of North Car-

olina (1775-1776) 1006 (W. Saunders ed. 1890) [hereinafter cited as Col. Rec.].
12. Id. art. XIII, 10 Col. Rec. 1008.
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1981
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the later Article of the Constitution of 1776 providing for the impeachment and removal of judges (as well as other officers) for "violating any Part of this Constitution, Mal-Administration, or Corruption'

8

constituted one of the first fruits of the people's newly

declared independence." The State had long wished to limit the
tenure of judges to the period of their good behavior, but had been
blocked by the Royal Authorities who wished judges to continue to
hold their offices at the pleasure of the Crown.16 With independence came the end of Royal Authority, allowing the Assembly to
enact constitutional provisions boldly declaring the responsibility
of the judiciary to the people. These provisions were soon to be
tested. A look at some of the most serious efforts to remove judges
for misconduct by impeachment reveals some of the weaknesses of
the traditional method.
A.

The Ashe, Spencer and Williams Proceedings (1786)"6

Pursuant to Article XIII of the Constitution of 1776 the General Assembly elected the first judges "of the Supreme Courts of
Law and Equity of the State.""' These three judges were Samuel
Ashe, Samuel Spencer and James Iredell. s Iredell resigned his seat
after only one term and was replaced by John Williams. 1 ' For
many years Ashe, Spencer and Williams were the only judges in
the State-"these three were the entire judiciary-Judges at nisi
prius and Judges in bank, Judges of law and Judges of equity,
Judges of the Superior and Judges of the Supreme Court." 0 It was
13. Id. art. XXIII, 10 Col. Rec. 1010.
14. The Constitution of 1776 was enacted by the Constitutional Convention
meeting in Halifax on 18 December 1776, slightly more than eight months after
the Halifax Resolves (12 April 1776) and a little over five months after the Unanimous Declaration of the Thirteen Colonies (4 July 1776). 10 Col. Rec. 1006.
15. 6 Col. Rec. 582-86 (1888).
16. These proceedings are nowhere denominated by the term impeachment, a
term which does not appear to have been in popular usage at that early date.
17. N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XIII, 10 Col. Rec. 1008.
18. Battle, supra note 1, at 849.
19. Id. Judge Iredell's career as a jurist does not appear to have suffered from
the resignation. He was appointed to the United States Supreme Court in 1790. 11
G. McRes, Lmi AND CosRmioNDRNcz or JAw s IDmamL 279 (1858) [hereinafter
referred to as II IminLL].
20. Battle, supra note 1, at 850. Because these judges functioned primarily as
trial court judges, and because there was not at this time a separate appellate
court, these men are generally recognized as the first superior court judges. The
first supreme court sitting separately and functioning solely as a court of appelhttp://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol4/iss1/1
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a somewhat singular occurrence, then, when in 1786 a petition was
presented in the Assembly to remove all three from the bench for
misdemeanors in office.' 1
The original charges as presented to the Assembly are no
longer extant; however, Alfred Moore gives a full account of those
charges in a letter to Iredell." The alleged offenses included:
High fines, and shameful appropriation of them.
Admitting new, and illegal prosecutions (depreciations, &c.)
The banishment of Brice and McNeill.
Dispensing with laws (the Newbern case).
Negligence of their duty, and delay of business.
Ill behavior to Mr. Hay at Wilmington."3

The second, third, and fourth of these charges are not germane to
the topic of this article; they appear to be addressed more to the
proper function and to the extent of the authority of the judiciary

in a new jurisdiction and not to any corruption or incompetency in
office.' 4 The sixth can likewise be dismissed as relating more to the
late review was not established until 1819. Ashe, Spencer and Williams were, however, the final authority on the law in North Carolina in 1786. Theirs are the
opinions which fill the early portions of the North Carolina Reports, and they
must be recognized as the supreme court of the State at that time.
21. This author is not aware of another instance involving proceedings for
the removal from office of a state's entire judiciary.
22. II IREDL 153-54 (1858).
23. Id. at 153. Moore, then Attorney General of the State and later Associate
Justice of the United States Supreme Court, noted that some of the charges were
"quite new" to him. He goes on to state that "these, and a few other charges
which I did not understand when I read them, nor can remember now, are urged
against their Honors with great violence ....

The Assembly has resolved that I

shall attend them; but do not say for what purpose. .. "
24. The fourth of the charges, for example, appears to be a reference to the
case of Bayard v. Singleton, 1 N.C. (Mart.) 5 (1787), wherein the Court ruled an
act of the legislature unconstitutional and therefore void. At the time this was a
radical concept: Bayard was "the first reported case in which an act of a Legislature was declared void because contrary to a written constitution." I R. CoNNOR,
NORTH CAROLINA: REBUILDING AN ANCIENT COMMONWEALTH 396 (1929). Bear in
mind that Bayard was decided sixteen years before the United States Supreme
Court reached the same result in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137
(1803). Although the opinion in Bayard had not yet been rendered when the
charges were preferred, the Court had continued the case until the next term.
Apparently, though, no secret had been made of the Court's resolve to invalidate
the Act, the Court's delay being occasioned primarily by the hope that the Assembly, which was to meet before the next term, would revise the law so as to render
it constitutional. See Letter of Samuel Ashe, C.J., to the General Assembly (14
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1981
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judges' manners than to their fitness to hold judicial office." The
first and fifth, however, do relate directly to the instant topic of
discipline and removal of judges for malfeasance in office.
These two charges are serious ones. If the judges appropriated
to themselves the fines collected in their courts, they were guilty of
the most flagrant corruption. If they neglected their duties and
delayed the business of the courts, they were at least guilty of
"Mal-Administration." As might be expected, however, it was with
the more political and legal questions (the second, third, and
fourth) that the Assembly seemed chiefly concerned. A committee
had been appointed by the Assembly to investigate the charges
against the judges.2 Their report concentrated on the other
charges but did clarify to some extent the two with which this Article is concerned.
The charge that the judges appropriated fines appears not to
have been supported by specific evidence although it was reiterated in the committee's report. It appears from the report that the
true gravamen of this charge may have been that the judges "did
declare that the General Assembly had no power to remit or suspend the payment of Fines until they should be paid into the
Treasury.""7 The committee did find substantial evidence of the
judges' irregular court attendance and of their lack of dispatch in
disposing of cases due to their frequent quarrels on the bench.28 It
Dec. 1786), in 18 The State Records of North Carolina (1786) 137, 139 (W. Clark
ed. 1900) [hereinafter cited as State Rec.].
25. Indeed, neither do Mr. Hay's manners appear beyond reproach. William
Hooper, in a letter to Iredell, tells of the following "adventure in court at Wilmington, the last hour of the last term.":
Williams expressing his opinion upon the treaty of peace to Hay, and
craving his attention to him. 'So this is your opinion, Judge Williams-your servant, sir,-I wish you a good night;' and waving his hands
and hat, and dodging his elegant bow, he marched out of the courthouse.
II IaanaLu, supra note 19, at 141; see also the letter of Archibald Maclaine to
Iredell, II IRwau at 143-44 for a fuller description of this incident.
26. The members of the Committee read like a "Who's Who" of distinguished North Carolinians of the period: Archibald Maclaine, William R. Davie,
William Hooper, Richard Dobbs Spaight, John Gray Blount, Jonathan Stoke, and
John Sitgreaves. It was probably unfortunate for the judges that Maclaine, who
along with Hay appears to be one of their chief antagonists (see II hImzLL, supra
note 19, at 125), apparently chaired the committee. 18 State Rec. 194. Maclaine
and Hay appear to have been law partners. 18 State Rec. 75.
27. 18 State Rec. 215.
28. Id. at 216.
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol4/iss1/1
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also appears that there was widespread dissatisfaction with the administration of justice." It is clear, however, from the correspondence of the men of note of the period, first, that the real reason
for the charges was ill feeling on the parts of Maclaine and Hay 0
and, second, that the charges were largely overstated.31
29. Hooper says:
The courts must be altered; and most earnestly do I hope that you
and Mr. Johnston will have a principal share in planning a new establishment. Against the present system the cries of the people are loud; they
must be heard. But what affects me most is, that the censure is pointed
at the Bar, when the occasion is seated much higher. It is a melancholy
consideration that we have not proper materials in this country to form
the officers which the constitution makes necessary. We must do the best
we can with such stuff as we have, until our academies and colleges supply us with something that may be more equal to the purpose.
Letter of William Hooper to James Iredell (6 July 1785), II InmsLL, supra note
19, at 125-26.
Hooper's opinion of the judges may have reflected the general sentiment at
the time, but history has not completely borne that sentiment out. Kemp Battle,
in his History of the Supreme Court (Feb. 4, 1889), 1 N.C. 835, 851 (4th ed. 1937),
concludes "that the Judges were not as learned or as dignified as our [present]
standards require, but they were by no means as deficient as the critical Federalist Lawyers painted them." Battle refers to Spencer as a man of "talent and influence," and Williams as "the most unlearned of the three," but points out his "unspotted reputation for integrity and charitable conduct." He says Ashe "was
undoubtedly a man of force, strong in intellect and will, though his taste did not
lie in hard study of the law." Battle states that the charge of "wrangling with the
bar and between the Judges, so often imputed to Spencer and Williams, were not
imputed to him," and notes that Ashe "had the confidence of his contemporaries." This latter observation is borne out by the fact that Ashe served for three
consecutive terms as Governor of the State, beginning in 1795 at the age of 70.
30. There had long raged between the Bench and the Bar, of which Hay and
Maclaine were members, a feud of major proportions. Both sides had aired their
views freely in the press, and, much to the chagrin of the lawyers, the judges had
gotten the better of the exchange. I R. CONNOR, supra note 24, at 396. Added to
this general ill feeling, the strong personal antipathy of Maclaine and Hay seems
to have reached the boiling point and roused the two men to action. Regarding
Maclaine's quarrels with the judges, see II IRmnLL, supra note 19, at 125. Regarding Hay's quarrels, see H Imwz.L at 141. Hooper tells Iredell he hopes he will
"temper the ardor of Maclaine, and keep under you the combustible stuff, which
is so ready to burst and blaze forth, in our friend Hay,. . . He boils with as much
fury against the judges, as Saul did against the Christians." Letter of William
Hooper to James Iredell (1 August 1786), II IimwnLL at 141.
31. Hooper notes "This ridiculous pursuit of Hay's .

.

. was conceived in

spleen, and conducted with such headstrong passion, that, after the charges were
made, evidence was .wanting to support them." Letter of William Hooper to
James Iredell (22 Jan. 1786), II IRRsLL, supra note 19, at 133.
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1981
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Perhaps the Assembly recognized the charges of Hay as the
product of a vendetta and the report of Maclaine's committee as
tainted by his personal antipathy for the judges. Perhaps the Assembly considered the charges in detail and determined evidence
to be lacking. Perhaps the Assembly was convinced of the judges'
innocence by the oral arguments presented by Spencer and Williams before a joint session of both Houses, 2 or by the letter sent
by Ashe in lieu of appearing in which he defended the charges stating that "In my Judicial Character I am righteous and therefore
bold.13 3 It seems most likely, however, that the Assembly vindicated the judges for the same reason that it had first elected them
to office;34 they were all three members of the majority Radical
Party. 5 At any rate the judges won out.
The Joint Assembly took up the charges separately and not
only found the judges not guilty of any misdemeanor in office,"
but went on to adopt a resolution thanking each judge by name for
3' 7
his "long and faithful services.
The first attempt to remove judges from the fledgling state's
judiciary had failed. Perhaps it should have. One is left wondering,
however, whether the real issue considered by the Assembly was
the judges' fitness to hold judicial office or their political affiliation.
The question remains whether the judges neglected their duties.
Also the argument of Spencer that "if he received any such fines
and forfeitures it was at a time when the Currency was greatly depreciated" gives one pause."
B. The Proceedings Against Judge Edmund W Jones (1870-71).
Superior Court Judge E. W. Jones of the Second Judicial District was the next judicial officer to face Articles of Impeachment.
32. 18 State Rec. vii. The texts of these statements have not survived.
33. 18 State Rec. 137-42.
34. Recall that under the Constitution of 1776, article XIII, judges were
elected by joint ballot of both houses of the Legislature.
35. See I R. CONNOR, supra note 24, at 395-96.
36. 18 State Rec. 212, 428, 429.
37. Id. at 461. To this resolution there were several protests, including of
course, those of Hay and Maclaine.
38. 18 State Rec. 480. As already noted, the text of Spencer's address to the
Joint Assembly is no longer extant. Supra note 32. The above quote is from the
remarks of Spencer's archenemy, Archibald Maclaine, upon entering his protest
to the disposition of the case, and may not fairly characterize the judge's
statement.
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol4/iss1/1
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In 1871 Judge Jones was charged by five Articles of Impeachment
with as many instances of public drunkenness.8 ' It appears that it

was not only the drunkenness, but the Judge's activities while inebriated that ultimately galvanized the House into action. One historian claims that the Judge
hastened matters when he forced his case upon the attention of
the legislature by making a brutal assault, while intoxicated, upon
a Negro strumpet who was in the room. She promptly had him
indicted, and a committee of investigation, which was at once appointed, found that his whole life and conduct had been such as
to make him an outcast from the society of decent men.' 0

The best example of the inadequacy of traditional methods of
discipline and removal comes during the turbulent period of Reconstruction. The impeachment proceedings had begun before the
Senate' 1 when certain influential members of the judiciary prevailed upon Jones to resign. ' s Governor Tod R. Caldwell refused to
accept Jones' resignation on the ground that the proceedings could

not be validly stayed once trial commenced in the Senate.' Having
39. N.C. HousE JouR. 1870-71 (1871) at 559-61.
40. J. HAMILTON, RECONSTRUCTION IN NORTH CAROLINA 562 (1914). The author states elsewhere that:
E.W. Jones, Superior Court judge for the second district, early brought
shame to the bench. Starting to Raleigh for the inauguration of the new
government [William Holden's, 1868, the first civil government in N.C.
since the war], he made a triumphal progress of continued drunkenness
and indecency. He was a public spectacle in Wilmington, and in Raleigh,
he remained intoxicated during his entire stay. On several occasions he
was guilty of deliberate exposure of his person upon the streets and was
arrested as a nuisance. Early in the session of the legislature, James Sinclair introduced a resolution calling for an investigation of his conduct
with a view to impeachment, but the House, by a vote of 51 to 31, declined to act on the ground stated by A.S. Seymour and General Abbott,
both carpetbaggers, that they had nothing to do with public morals and
that drunkenness was not an impeachable offence.
Id. at 347-48. Apparently, the later assault incident was the last straw.
41. The trial had begun, but barely. The Senate had agreed to employ the
same rules used in the trial of Governor William W. Holden and had orderd that
a summons be issued for Judge Jones to appear and answer the charges against
him. It was at this point that Judge Jones tendered his resignation. N.C. SEN.
JOUR. 1870-71 (27 March 1871) at 701-02.
42. Hamilton states that these jurists included Chief Justice Richmond Pearson and Justice (later Chief Justice) William Rodman. J. HAmL'ToN, supra note
40, at 562.
43. N.C. HOUSE JouR. 1870-71 (1871) at 623.
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1981
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recently completed the time-consuming and expensive process of
removing from office Governor William W. Holden," however, the

legislature elected to pursue the quicker, easier, and less expensive
route of clearing the way for Jones' resignation. The House withdrew the Articles of Impeachment on the same day they were informed of the Governor's refusal to accept Jones' resignation.4'6
This episode illuminates one of the chief shortcomings in the

impeachment procedure." In a case in which apparently all agreed
that Judge Jones was a disgrace to the bench, the great expenditure of time and money necesssary to hold a trial before the Senate

served to insulate Judge Jones from the sanction he may have, and
most probably, deserved. Of course, had he not resigned, it is most
likely that the impeachment trial would have been allowed to con-

tinue, 7 but the charges against Judge Jones, if true, warranted his
removal from office. To the contrary, because of the inconvenience
inherent in the impeachment process, he was allowed to voluntarily resign and was not forced to run the risk of being "deposed

from his office and disqualified from holding any office of trust or
profit in the State hereafter," as had been adjudged by the Senate
in the case of Governor Holden."
C.

The Charges Against Chief Justice Richmond M. Pearson

(1870-71).
Another incident which arose during the State's turbulent Re44. The subject of this article is judicial impeachments. The impeachment of
Governor Holden will not, therefore, be treated. For those interested in the
Holden trial, the full proceedings have been recorded in the three-volume work
THE IMPEACHMENT TRIAL OF Gov. W.W. HOLDEN (1871).
45. N.C. HOUSE JOUR. 1870-71 (March 31, 1871) at 623.
46. The full record of the proceedings before the Senate on the matter of the
impeachment of Judge Edmund W. Jones appears at 1870-71 Senate Journal 699704.
47. Hamilton insists, "But for the expense, Jones would have been tried as a
public example." J. HAMILTON, supra note 40, at 562.
48. N.C. HOUSE JouR. 1870-71 (1871) at 529. This was the language of the
Senate's memorial to the House reporting the outcome of the impeachment trial.
The actual language of the Senate's judgment is even more sternly worded:
Now, therefore, it is adjudged by the senate of North Carolina sitting as a court of impeachment, at their chamber in the city of Raleigh,
that the said William W. Holden be removed from the office of governor
and be disqualified to hold any office of honor, trust or profit under the
state of North Carolina.

3

IMPEACHMENT TRIAL OF

W. W.

HOLDEN

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol4/iss1/1
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construction Period underscores the political nature of the impeachment remedy.
Governor William W. Holden was impeached, convicted and
removed from office in 1871." Among other crimes and misdemeanors, the Governor was charged with falsely proclaiming a
state of insurrection in several Piedmont counties, and declaring
martial law and making war on the citizens of those counties."
Several citizens petitioned Chief Justice Richmond Pearson for
writs of habeas corpus to deliver to the civil authorities numerous
citizens who had been arrested during the alleged insurrection. 1
Such writs were issued by the Chief Justice, but were not
honored by the commander of the Governor's military forces in the
occupied area.5 2 They were returned with the message from the
military commander, a George W. Kirk, to "[t]ake the papers back
and tell them [the Supreme Court] that the Court [apparently a
military tribunal] has been appointed to try them, (meaning the
men in custody,) that he [Kirk] would surrender them on Gov.
Holden's order, but not otherwise, unless they sent a sufficient
force to whip him, and take them, (meaning the persons mentioned
in the several writs,) away from him." 83 The Chief Justice responded by directing the writs to be served on Governor Holden,
who also refused to honor them." Seeing this refusal as a conflict
between two branches of government, the Chief Justice delivered
an eloquent opinion in which he courageously declared that the
Governor "has no power to disobey the writ of habeas corpus, or to
order the trial of any citizen otherwise than by jury."5' 5 The Chief
Justice also faced a dilemma. He recognized that the judiciary has
no power to force the Executive to obey the law. The only avenue
open to Chief Justice Pearson was to declare the law and express
his hope that the Governor would obey his constitutional duty to
enforce that law. As he stated in the opinion: "[T]he whole physical power of the State is by the Constitution under the control of
the Governor. The Judiciary has only a moral power. By the theory
of the Constitution there can be no conflict between these two
49. N.C. HoUsE JouR. 1870-71 (1871) at 529.

50. Id.
51. Ex Parte Moore, 64 N.C. 802, 802 (1870).
52. Id.

53. Id.
54. Letter of W. W. Holden to the Hon. Richmond M. Pearson (19 July
1870), 64 N.C. 802, 804 (1870).
55. Ex Parte Moore, 64 N.C. 802, 808 (1870).
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branches of the government. ... I have discharged my duty; the
power of the Judiciary is exhausted, and the responsibility must
rest on the Executive.""
Public opinion, however, was strongly against the Governor by
this time. Calls for Holden's impeachment were widespread and at
least one newspaper, The Sentinel, called for impeachment of
Pearson as well, alleging that his guilt for failing to call out the
posse comitatus to enforce his writs of habeas corpus was as great
as the Governor's for failing to honor the writs.5' The charges were
so pervasive that the Chief Justice felt the need to respond in the
North Carolina Reports."s
Pearson, however, had been a professor of law before coming
to the bench and had the good fortune to have had as students
many of the prominent lawyers in the State at the time. Many of
these lawyers held positions in the government and exercised their
influence in behalf of the Chief Justice.5" At any rate, no official
action was ever taken against Chief Justice Pearson." It appears
today that his conduct did not warrant impeachment, but at the
time, proceedings could have been forestalled by Chief Justice
Pearson's prestige and personal influence.
D.

The Impeachment Trial of Furches and Douglas (1901). 61

Governor Daniel L. Russell, a Republican-Populist, was
elected in 1896. In 1897 the General Assembly, controlled by the
Republican-Populists, passed an Act to promote the oyster industry in North Carolina. Governor Russell appointed Theophilus
White as Chief Inspector of the oyster industry for a period of four
years. The Act fixed his compensation at $75.00 per month plus
expenses.
In 1898 there was a political turnaround and the General Assembly was controlled by the Democrats. In 1899 the Assembly
passed a new Act which named seven commissioners for the shellfish industry, repealed the 1897 Act, and provided that no payId. at 810-11.
J. HAMILTON, supra note 40, at 537.
65 N.C. 349 (1871).
J. HAMILTON, supra note 40, at 541.
In fact, he was allowed to preside over the impeachment trial of Holden.
1 THE IMPEACHMENT TRIAL OF W.W. HOLDEN 18, 20-21 (1871).
61. Much of the background for this part of the article is borrowed from Justice J. William Copeland's story Much Ado About An Inspector's Pay, in the May
1978 issue of "The State," Vol. 45, No. 12.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol4/iss1/1

12

Clark: The Discipline and Removal of Judges in North Carolina

19811

DISCIPLINE AND

REMOVAL

ment be made to anyone for services rendered concerning the
shellfish industry except for services rendered under the 1899 Act.
White instituted a quo warranto to test his right to be Chief
Inspector. In White v. Hill, 2 the Supreme Court held that White
was entitled to hold the office of Chief Inspector for the remainder
of his four-year term. The opinion was written by Chief Justice
Faircloth in which Justices Furches, Douglas, and Montgomery
joined. Justice Clark dissented. Faircloth, Furches and Douglas
were Republicans. Montgomery and Clark were Democrats.
The State Auditor and Treasurer ignored the Supreme Court
decision and refused to pay White, who then brought a mandamus
proceeding to compel payment. In White v. Ayer," the Supreme
Court in a 3-2 decision directed that payment be made. Chief Justice Faircloth and Justices Furches and Douglas were the majority,
each being Republicans. Justices Clark fnd Montgomery, Democrats, dissented. The majority based its opinion on the principles
of law that a public office was private property, relying on Hoke v.
Henderson." The Treasurer was later ordered by the Court to
make the payment and he complied. The Hoke decision was subsequently overruled in Mial v. Ellington."
The Democrats were aroused. Aycock was elected Governor in
1900. Before he was sworn in on January 15, 1901, Governor Russell appointed Furches as Chief Justice after Faircloth died on December 30, 1900, and he appointed Charles A. Cook, Republican,
to take the Furches seat. Soon after the General Assembly, controlled by the Democrats, came to Raleigh, Articles of Impeachment were presented in the House against Chief Justice Furches
and Justice Douglas, and the House elected a Board of Managers
to be in charge of the proceedings. The five Articles generally
charged the judges with violating their oath of office in ordering
the State Treasurer to pay to White the sum of $831.15 pursuant
to the White v. Ayer decision."
The vote in the House was fifty six votes for the five Articles
of Impeachment and thirty three in opposition. Generally, the vote
followed party lines.
On 20 February 1901, Articles of Impeachment were sent to
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

125 N.C. 194, 34 S.E. 432 (1899).
126 N.C. 570, 36 S.E. 132 (1900).
15 N.C. 1 (1833).
134 N.C. 131, 46 S.E. 961 (1903).
N.C. HousE JOUR. 1901 at 713.
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the Senate, 61 which was charged under the Constitution with the
duty of trial. Evidence was presented for over two weeks. The Senate and counsel for the prosecution and the judges relied chiefly
upon the Andrew Johnson Impeachment trial in the United States
Senate for legal authority. All of the members of the Supreme
Court, except the recently appointed Justice Cook, appeared as
witnesses, and they were questioned extensively and in detail
about what occurred during the court conferences relating to
White v. Ayer. The defending judges contended they were only interpreting the law as they understood it." The prosecution contended they were involved in a Republican conspiracy to illegally
retain and pay a Republican officeholder, Theophilus White.
After the evidence was in, counsel for the prosecution and the
defense made arguments so lengthy that only the opening and closing arguments were included in the printed record of the trial.
This was followed by a roll call, and each Senator was permitted
two minutes in which to explain his vote. The vote on the first
Article was twenty seven for guilty and twenty three not guilty,
and this was the strongest vote for the prosecution, which did not
get a majority vote on any of the other four Articles. Thus, the
prosecution failed to get the two-thirds majority which the Constitution required for impeachment.
Justice Copeland in his article in the May 1978 issue of "The
State" made the following conclusive comment:
Today, when I look back on this trial with all its ramifications, I must conclude that it was a political trial. Chief Justice
Furches and Justice Douglas appeared to have overreacted to the
loss of one little job held by Theophilus White. They had no right
to invade the State Treasury for the $831.15 to pay White when
this money had not been appropriated by the General Assembly
for this purpose. But it was a borderline impeachable offence. It is
remarkable that the participants in 1901 voted very much like the
respective counties they represented would vote today. Under the
circumstances the acquittal of Chief Justice Furches and Justice
Douglas came about because of a few conscientious Democrats,
such as Judge Henry Groves Connor, who did their duty as they
saw it. But those involved, as well as their kinsmen, who stood
with the Democratic party in this trial received many of the political rewards for the next fifty years."
67. N.C. HousE JouIL 1901 at 428.
68. Public Documents, 1901, Document No. 26.
69. Copeland, Much Ado About an Inspector's Pay, 45 Tii
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol4/iss1/1

STATs (May,
14

Clark: The Discipline and Removal of Judges in North Carolina

1981]

DISCIPLINE AND REMOVAL

E. The Judge Harwood Resignation (1932).
John H. Harwood was appointed by Governor McLean in 1926
to serve the unexpired term (six months) of Resident Superior
Court Judge Bryson. For the first time, in 1927, the Legislature
created the office of Special Judge of Superior Court, 0 requiring
the Governor to appoint four Special Judges. Harwood was appointed in 1927 by Governor McLean and reappointed by Governor Gardner in June 1931.
An audit of the License Bureau of the Department of Revenue
in 1931 revealed that Lola G. Hatwood, a clerk, failed to account
for $4,903. A civil action was instituted against her by the State to
recover this sum. She denied the allegations.
In July, 1931, Judge Small ordered that the defendant and her
counsel have access to the books and records of the Department of
Revenue for the purpose of examining them. A bill of indictment
for embezzlement was returned against Miss Harwood at the September Term, 1931, Superior Court of Wake County. J. M.
Broughton was appointed referee.
Judge Harwood, father of the defendant, under the authority
of Judge Small's order, was allowed access to the books and
records of the Department, and on several occasions he was alone
in the Revenue Building before and after the usual working hours.
An examination of the relevant books and records on February 1,
1932, revealed erasures, substitutions, and mutilations made after
the 1931 audit which tended to exculpate Miss Harwood. A bill of
indictment was returned against Judge Harwood for the erasure
and mutilation of these public records. 1
Judge Harwood on April 15, 1932, wrote two letters to Governor Gardner. In one he resigned as Special Judge of Superior
Court. In the other he expressed regret for any embarrassment he
may have brought to the Governor and added, "I was too weak to
withstand the temptation. She is my only child .... ,

In State v. Harwood,7" it is revealed that Judge Harwood and
his daughter, Lola, entered pleas of guilty to the charges against
1978).
70. 1927 N.C. Sess. Laws, ch. 206.
71. Letter from Attorney General Dennis G. Brummitt to Governor Gardner
(11 Feb. 1932) [in Governor Gardner Papers, General Correspondence 1929-1933
(No. 104), Dept. of Archives and History].
72. Id.
73. 206 N.C. 87, 173 S.E. 24 (1934).
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them at the April Term, 1932. Presiding Judge Dewin sentenced
John H. Harwood to imprisonment for one year in the State
Prison, and further ordered that he be disbarred from practicing as
an attorney at law. After serving his prison term, Harwood, in October, 1933, moved to vacate the order of disbarment. The motion
was denied and on appeal was affirmed by the Supreme Court,
which in its decision made the following comment: "The case is
that of a licensed attorney who, after appointment to the bench,
turned from the exercise of judicial functions to the private inspection and the secret and deceptive mutilation and destruction of
momentous public records . . ."

Without question Judge Harwood resigned because of the
pending criminal charge against whirh he had no effective defense.
The author is aware of other resignations by judges while charges
or complaints were pending, but the reasons for these resignations
are not so obvious. Whether the pending charges or complaints
materially influenced the resignation decision is purely speculative.
IV. THE JUDICIAL STANDARDS
A.

COMMISSION

(1973-1981).

The Creation, Composition, and Powers of the Commission.

In 1960, the State of California created its Commission on Judicial Qualifications,7 6 now called the Commission on Judicial Performance, and as such became the first state to respond to the
cumbersome, expensive, and ineffective nature of traditional remedies for judicial misconduct or disability such as impeachment, address, or even elections. Thirteen years later, North Carolina
joined the twenty four other states and the District of Columbia
which had followed California's lead by creating judicial conduct
organizations. 7 6 Today, all the states and the District of Columbia
have established systems 77 to respond to those instances in which
the misconduct or physical or mental disability of a member of the
judiciary threatens to undermine the integrity of the judicial
process.
The Judicial Standards Commission of North Carolina was
74. Id. at 89, 173 S.E. at 25.
75. CAL. CONST. art. VI, §§ 8, 18.
76. See I. TESITOR & D. SINKS, JUDCIAL CONDUCT ORGANIZATIONS (2d ed.
1980).
77. Id.; Washington was the last state to establish a judicial conduct organization when an amendment to its Constitution was ratified in November, 1980
(WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 31, amend. 71).
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created by an amendment to Article IV, § 17, of the Constitution
of North Carolina which was proposed by the General Assembly
and approved by the voters in the general election on November 7,
1972. 7 8 The primary effect of the amendment was to add a new
subsection (2) to section 17 of the Constitution dealing with the
removal of judges, magistrates, and clerks of court. The amendment mandated the General Assembly to prescribe a procedure in
addition to impeachment or address for the removal of judges,
both trial and appellate. Interestingly, this amendment also contained the first authorization for censure, a disciplinary measure in
the nature of a formal, public reprimand designed to address instances of misconduct which do not warrant removal. The procedure adopted would be designed to censure or remove a judge or
justice for willful misconduct in office, conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute, willful and persistent failure to perform his or her duties,
habitual intemperance, or conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude. In addition, a judge or justice could be removed from
office for mental or physical incapacity which was interfering with
the performance of judicial duties and was, or was likely to be7
come, permanent. '
In light of the mandate embodied in this amendment, the
General Assembly enacted a new Article 30 to Chapter 7A of the
General Statutes " and thereby established, effective 1 January
1973 and conditioned upon ratification of the proposed amendment to Article IV, § 17, the Judicial Standards Commission (hereinafter referred to as the Commission).
The original statutory provisions relating to the Commission' 1
describe its composition and the terms of members, reiterate the
constitutional grounds for censure or removal, prescribe the consequences of removal, establish certain procedural guidelines and
standards for proceedings before the Commission concerning a justice or judge, and authorize the employment of a staff. While
amendments have been few, provisions were added which dealt
with appointment of an alternate in case of disability or disqualification of a Commission member and provided for participation in
formal proceedings begun prior to expiration of a non-judicial
78.
79.
80.
81.

1971
N.C.
1971
N.C.

N.C. Sess. Laws, ch. 560.
CONsT. art. IV, § 17(2).

N.C. Seas. Laws, ch. 590.
GEN. STAT. § 7A-375, et. seq. (1981).
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member's term or termination of a judicial member's term by virtue of retirement or resignation from judicial office or expiration of
the judicial term of office. 82 In addition, staff assistance was enlarged to provide investigative capacity; and statewide authority to
serve subpoenas or other process issued by the Commission was
granted to the executive secretary, special counsel, and investigator.8 3 Then, in 1975, the General Assembly allowed judicial members to be paid their travel and subsistence expenses incurred in
the course of Commission business." Finally, and most importantly, the General Assembly passed legislation which addressed
concerns regarding what might happen should a Commission recommendation ever be filed involving a justice of the North Carolina Supreme Court. Under then existing statutes, North Carolina
General Statutes, sections 7A-376 and 377,85 such a recommendation would be filed with and reviewed by the Supreme Court and
could raise jurisdictional questions as well as questions regarding
conflict of interest and disqualification. [North Carolina General
Statutes hereinafter designated G.S.] In response to such concerns,
the Legislature ratified a bill," the result of which was to establish
a procedure whereby a Commission recommendation for censure or
removal of a Supreme Court justice would be filed with and reviewed by a seven-member panel of the North Carolina Court of
Appeals. The panel was to consist of the chief judge and the six
judges most senior in service, excluding the judge serving as the
Commission's chairman. 7
The Commission is composed of seven members: a Court of
Appeals judge who by law serves as the chairman, a superior court
judge, and a district court judge appointed by the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court; two attorneys elected by the Council of The
North Carolina State Bar; and two citizens appointed by the Governor. Although one judge, one attorney, and one citizen member
were initially appointed to three-year terms in order to achieve
overlapping, the regular term for any member is six years; and
once a member has served a full six-year term, he or she cannot be
reappointed.8 8 While some may argue that the composition of the
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

1973 N.C. Sess. Laws, ch. 50.
1973 N.C. Sess. Laws, ch. 808.
1975 N.C. Seas. Laws, ch. 956.
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-376, 377 (1981).
1979 N.C. Seas. Laws, ch. 486.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-378 (1981).
Id. § 7A-375.

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol4/iss1/1

18

Clark: The Discipline and Removal of Judges in North Carolina

19811

DISCIPLINE AND REMOVAL

Commission leans too heavily in favor of judges and automatically
biases the Commission in favor of any judge who is the subject of a
complaint, it may also be argued that strong representation on
such a disciplinary agency by members of the judiciary is imperative in order to insure responsible action by the Commission and to
prevent "overkill," particularly in light of the confidential nature
of Commission proceedings and the fact that the Commission is
dealing with elected officials. On the other hand, the Commission
must maintain the confidence of the people as well as that of the
judiciary, and the presence of lay members is designed to enhance
the credibility of the Commission and its proceedings.
As the appropriate agency for review of complaints "concerning the qualifications or conduct of any justice or judge of the General Court of Justice,"' 8 the Commission is empowered to receive
complaints of judicial misconduct or disability, order investigation
of such complaints or initiate an investigation on its own motion,
institute formal proceedings, conduct hearings, and recommend
disciplinary action if five members concur.' 0 It is important to note
that the Commission itself can neither censure nor remove; it aids
the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals in determining the fitness
of a judge or justice, and it is for the appropriate court to actually
impose any sanctions. As Justice Exum first stated and as the Supreme Court has reiterated:
[A proceeding before the Commission] is neither criminal nor civil in nature. It is an inquiry into the conduct of a
judicial officer, the purpose of which is not primarily to
punish any individual but to maintain due and proper administration of justice in our State's courts, public confidence in its judicial system, and the honor and integrity of
its judges. 91
B.

Confidentiality.

Once a recommendation has been filed, it becomes public
along with the record supporting it; otherwise, all proceedings
before the Commission and papers filed with the Commission are
considered confidential unless the judge involved otherwise requests. This confidentiality feature is not uncommon; in fact, all
jurisdictions having judicial conduct organizations include such
89. Id. § 7A-377(a).
90. Id.

91. In re Crutchfield, 289 N.C. 597, 602, 223 S.E.2d 822, 825 (1975).
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provisions.9 2 The distinction among the jurisdictions relates to the

point at which confidentiality ceases. North Carolina is among the
plurality of jurisdictions in which confidentiality ceases when a
commission or similar body makes its recommendation for discipline. In fourteen jurisdictions confidentiality ceases when formal
charges are filed by the conduct organization. "
This confidentiality is designed not only to protect a judge's
reputation and the integrity of the judiciary from unfounded or
frivolous complaints but also to encourage those who feel they
have knowledge of judicial misconduct to express their concern by
making a complaint. However, experience has revealed that when
the formal complaint has been filed and subpoenas issued, the nature of the charges and the Commission hearing become known to
the public and the news media. Confidentiality beyond the point
when the formal complaint is filed results in reduced public confidence and deprives judges of accurate information as to the proper
limits of judicial discretion.
C.

The Appellate Review.

After a recommendation is filed, the respondent judge must
petition the Supreme Court for review, and by petitioning for review, the respondent preserves his right to file a brief and present
oral argument." The Commission's recommendation is "not binding on the Supreme Court, which will consider the evidence of both
sides and exercise its independent judgment as to whether it
should censure, remove, or decline to do either." 8 Essentially, the
Court must determine, based on the record of proceedings before
the Commission, whether the findings of fact and conclusions of
law of the Commission are supported by clear and convincing evidence, the requisite burden of proof;" whether the conduct in
question constitutes one of the grounds for censure or removal
specified in the Constitution and by law; and the appropriate disciplinary sanction to be imposed, if any. Thus, it is for the Court to
approve or reject the recommendation or remand it for further
92. See 1981 Wash. Laws, ch. 268; I. TESrrOR & D. SINKS, supra note 76.
93. I. TEsITOR & D. SINKS, supra note 76.
94. Rule 2, Rules for Supreme Court Review of Recommendations of the Judicial Standards Commission, 288 N.C. 740 (1975), 289 N.C. 732 (1976).
95. In re Nowell, 293 N.C. 235, 244, 237 S.E.2d 246, 252 (1977).
96. Id. at 247, 237 S.E.2d at 254.
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proceedings."
Although the consequences of removal from office for other
than mental or physical disability include loss of retirement benefits and disqualifications from holding further judicial office,' 8
"censure and removal are not to be regarded as punishment but as
the legal consequences attached to adjudged judicial misconduct or
unfitness."" While certainly not as serious as the sanction of removal, censure can deter the respondent judge from pursuing a
similar course of conduct in the future. Because of its public nature and the weight it carries, censure can also place other members of the judiciary on notice that the particular conduct involved
violates the standard of behavior expected of a judicial official.
D.

Rules of Procedure.

Pursuant to statutory authority,' °° the Commission adopted a
set of twenty rules at its first meeting on February 2, 1973, to govern its operation.' 01 In this regard the Commission is in the somewhat unique position of being able to promulgate its own rules of
procedure without any requirement for approval, adoption, or certification by the Supreme Court. Perhaps since proceedings before
the Commission could involve a justice of the Supreme Court, the
legislature recognized the independent existence of the Commission by granting such rule-making authority.
In addition to providing a framework for the orderly disposition of complaints concerning the conduct of a member of the judiciary, the rules also incorporate safeguards in an effort to insure
that proceedings before the Commission comport with basic due
process requirements. For example, the rules provide for notice of
the charges against the respondent and the identity of the com0 the opportunity to file an answer;'1
0 notice of the forplainant; 1°
mal hearing;'" the right to a public hearing;'" 8 and the right to
97. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-377(a) (1981). The power of the Supreme Court to
impose a sanction other than that recommended by the Commission is discussed
in Note, 14 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1187 (1978).
98. Id. § 7A-376.
99. In re Nowell, 293 N.C. 235, 241, 237 S.E.2d 246, 251 (1977).
100. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-377(a) (1981).
101. Judicial Standards Comm'n R., 283 N.C. 763 (1973), 288 N.C. 738
(1975), 293 N.C. 747 (1978).
102. Id. R. 8.
103. Id. R. 9.
104. Id. R. 10.
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counsel, to introduce evidence, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to have subpoenas issued for attendance of witnesses
or for production of books, papers, and other evidentiary matter.'"
Proceedings before the Commission generally are triggered by
receipt of a written complaint. 107 No particular complaint form is
used; a letter narrating what has occurred and what particular conduct is being questioned is sufficient. The principal effect of the
requirement is to screen complainants whose credibility falters
when asked to reduce their grievance to written form. This requirement that a complaint be submitted in writing does not preclude the Commission from considering allegations made orally or
which are brought to its attention by another governmental agency
or official or through media reports since the Commission has the
option of proceeding on its own motion. 1 " The Commission recognizes that in spite of the confidentiality provisions relating to its
proceedings and papers filed in relation thereto, there may be complainants such as lawyers, judges, or litigants who prefer to remain
anonymous. In such instances the reliability of the source may be
the key factor in a Commission determination to proceed on its
own motion.
Once a complaint is received, it is acknowledged, appropriately
indexed, and placed on the agenda of items for review by the Commission to determine whether an investigation is warranted. Upon
its initial review, the Commission determines whether the allegations involve a judge and whether the alleged facts indicate conduct which is of such a nature as warrants further action, i.e.,
would the conduct, if proven true, constitute one of the grounds
for censure or removal. If the Commission determines that a complaint contains factual allegations of judicial misconduct or disability, it then orders a preliminary investigation. As noted earlier, the
Commission can also order an investigation on its own motion
based on information from a reliable source. If the Commission determines that no action is warranted, the complainant is so advised
and can request reconsideration of the determination if the complainant disagrees with the action.1 "
105. Id. R. 4.
106. Id. R. 13.
107. N.C.

GEN. STAT.

§ 7A-377(a) (1981); Judicial Standards Comm'n R. 4,

supra note 101.
108. N.C. GEN.

STAT.

§ 7A-377(a) (1981); Judicial Standards Comm's R. 7,

supra note 101.
109. Judicial Standards Comm'n R. 6, supra note 101.
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Following initiation of a preliminary investigation, the respondent judge and the complainant are notified of the investigation,
and the respondent is advised of the nature of the allegations and
of the opportunity to submit such information regarding the complaint as he or she may choose.'11 The respondent is not advised at
this point of the complainant's identity although the respondent is
told whether the investigation is based on a written complaint duly
filed with the Commission or has been ordered by the Commission
on its own motion."" Because the Commission attempts to draft
the notice of investigation with such particularity as will allow therespondent to respond in a meaningful manner, however, the respondent may be able to determine the complainant's identity
with some degree of certainty, especially where a particular case is
involved. Although the rules do not require it, the general practice
of the Commission has been to advise the complainant as well that
an investigation has been ordered. This can be particularly important where the complainant is involved in pending litigation or litigation of an on-going nature such as a domestic matter.
Based on the information developed by the investigation and
included in the preliminary investigative report, the Commission
determines whether formal proceedings should be instituted. If so,
the respondent is served with a notice of proceedings identifying
the complainant, specifying the charge or charges against him or
her in ordinary and concise language, and advising him or her of
the right to file a written, verified answer within twenty days after
service of the notice.11 At the same time, the respondent is served
with a copy of the verified formal complaint filed by special counsel to the Commission which sets forth the alleged facts upon
which the charge or charges are based.1 18
After the respondent's answer is filed or upon expiration of
the time allowed for filing, the Commission orders a formal hearing
which cannot be held sooner than ten days after the answer is filed
or the time allowed for filing an answer has expired, unless the
respondent consents to an earlier hearing.11' The provision for
filing an answer is permissive rather than mandatory, and there is
very little incentive for a respondent to answer the charges prior to
110. Id. R. 7.
111. Id.

112. Id. R. 8, 9.
113. Id.
114. Id. R. 10.
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the hearing since the Commission must proceed whether or not an
answer has been filed or the respondent appears. In addition, the
respondent's failure to answer or appear cannot be used as evidence of the facts alleged in the charges.l 11 Since Commission proceedings are "neither criminal nor civil in nature,"" it is arguable
that a better approach would be to require filing of an answer and
allow a respondent's failure to answer to appear to be taken as
some evidence of the truth of the facts alleged without going so far
as to deem failure to answer to be an admission of the allegations
17
of the formal complaint as would be the case in a civil matter.
Chief Justice Sharp, writing for the Supreme Court in In re Peoples, specifically commented on the respondent's failure to answer
the charges and his failure to testify or appear in person at the
hearing.' 8 The former Chief Justice points out that it is only in
criminal cases that a defendant's failure to testify creates no presumption against him or her. Quoting from several decisions,
Sharp states that in all other proceedings "[i]f the party is a competent witness, his failure to go upon the stand 'when the case is
such as to call for an explanation.

. .

or the evidence is such as to

call for a denial,' it is a 'circumstance against him' and a 'proper
subject of fair comment.' ",9 On the other hand, the present approach does put the Commission to its proof which may be more
desirable in light of the potentially severe consequences to the respondent upon adverse findings by the Commission.
At the conclusion of a formal hearing, the Commission must
determine whether to recommend censure or removal, a determination requiring the affirmative vote of five members. 1 0 If a recommendation for censure or removal is approved, a record of the
proceedings is prepared, including a transcript of the formal hearing, along with findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of
the recommendation, and time is allowed for settlement of any objections the respondent might have to the record."" Upon settlement of the record, it is filed with the appropriate court for
115.
116.
117.
118.
U.S. 929
119.
120.
121.

Id.
In re Crutchfield, 289 N.C. 597, 602, 223 S.E.2d 822, 825 (1975).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 8(d) (1967).
In re Peoples, 296 N.C. 109, 250 S.E.2d 890 (1978), cert. denied, 442
(1979).
Id. at 152, 250 S.E.2d at 915 (1978).
Judicial Standards Comm's R. 10, 16, supra note 101.
Id. R. 13, 18.

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol4/iss1/1

24

Clark: The Discipline and Removal of Judges in North Carolina
1981]

DISCIPLINE AND REMOVAL

review.' 22
The rules of the Commission are simple and not intended to
treat all procedural questions which may arise, but the Commission has made them work. Due process rights have been recognized
and questions raised have been determined on their merits.
It should be noted that in the course of proceedings before the
Commission, a disciplinary measure known as a private reprimand
is occasionally used although no provision for such action is specifically recognized in the statutes or the Commission rules. The private reprimand has been developed by the Commission to deal
with complaints in which the conduct may be improper but the
nature of the conduct or the attitude of the judge indicates that a
recommendation for censure or removal would be unwarranted.
The judge is required to appear before the Commission for service
and reading of the reprimand. Issuance of a private reprimand can
occur at any stage of Commission proceedings following completion
of the preliminary investigation, even after a formal hearing, and it
effectively terminates proceedings. However, the reprimand is recorded in the respondent's case file, thereby putting him or her on
notice of the Commission's views regarding the conduct and the
consequences which may ensue any repetition.
It should also be noted that despite a steady workload increase, the Commission had no full-time staff prior to 1977. It had
the statutory authority to employ the services of an executive secretary, investigator, and special counsel, but no legislative appropriation prior to 1976 to cover such costs; therefore, the Commission chairman and secretary performed the duties which would
ordinarily be done by an executive secretary. In 1976 the Commission called on the State Bureau of Investigation and a Judicial Department employee to perform investigative work, and the Attorney General and The North Carolina State Bar provided attorneys
to serve as special counsel when needed. Finally, in 1977 a permanent staff consisting of an executive secretary, investigator, and
secretary was established through a grant from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration of the U. S. Department of Justice, and the program cost was assumed by the State on July 1,
1979. The presence of a staff facilitates the Commission in the performance of its disciplinary responsibilities and increases its visibility and accessibility to the public.
122. Id. R. 19, 20.
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The Complaints to the Commission

An examination of data available covering Commission
caseload and activities during its nine-year existence reveals that
the Commission has received a total of 476 complaints and, as of
the end of 1981, had disposed of all but five matters; four complaints pending initial review and one preliminary investigation
awaiting further action. Its caseload has gone from twenty three
complaints filed in 1973, its initial year of existence, to a high of
eighty seven complaints filed in 1980. It is interesting to note that
only fifty six complaints were filed in 1981 which represents a
rather significant 36% drop from the previous year. By looking at
sources of complaints in these two years, it is readily apparent that
a sharp reduction in the number of complaints filed by civil litigants and criminal defendants precipitated the decline in caseload;
however, one can only speculate as to why these sources did not
file with as much frequency. Since these complaint sources are the
most likely to question judicial rulings or decisions in cases and
such questions are not within the Commission's jurisdiction, one
might assume that the public is more knowledgeable concerning
the Commission's authority and function. Such an assumption may
be completely unwarranted, however, since the percentage of 1981
complaints investigated is consistent with the percentage of total
complaints filed during prior years which were investigated, and if
complaints without merit were being reduced as a result of public
knowledge of the Commission's function, one might expect the percentage of complaints investigated to increase.
Generally, the most frequent subjects of complaints filed with
the Commission in its history have been district court judges.
While exact numbers are unavailable for all years, the data for
1980 and 1981 reveals that the 143 complaints filed in those years
involved 150 judges, nearly 77% of whom were district court
judges. Almost 23 % were superior court judges, and less than 1%
were appellate court judges.
During this same two-year time period, the most frequent
complainants were civil litigants who filed 38% of the complaints.
Non-litigating citizens such as friends or relatives of civil litigants
or criminal defendants and witnesses constituted 22% of the complainants, and criminal defendants were responsible for 13% of the
complaints.
Traditionally, the subject matter of many complaints has
seemed to involve questions concerning legal decisions, evidentiary
rulings, and judgments. This traditional view is supported by an
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol4/iss1/1
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examination of 1980 and 1981 complaints. While it is occasionally
difficult to categorize the nature of the judicial conduct complained
of, roughly 34% of the questions raised in complaints against
judges related to legal decisions, evidentiary rulings, or judgments;
another 15% of the questions concerned alleged procedural or administrative irregularities; and 16% dealt with courtroom
demeanor.1 '
F.

Commission Action

As one might suspect in view of the large percentage of questions regarding legal decisions, evidentiary rulings, or judgments, a
large percentage of complaints received are disposed of early in the
filtering process. Of the 476 complaints received by the Commission in its nine-year history, 398 (84%) have been concluded after
initial review. Of this number, 333 (70%) were not within the
Commission's jurisdiction and primarily either presented no allegations of judicial misconduct or presented matters for appeal or
other legal remedy. Sixty five complaints were determined to present allegations of misconduct which were not of such a nature as
to warrant investigation or other action. Another four complaints
were awaiting initial review at the end of 1981.
The Commission has ordered sixty five preliminary investigations covering seventy four (16%) of the 476 complaints received,
and only one investigative file remained open as of the end of 1981.
Of the sixty four preliminary investigations completed, thirty four
were closed after consideration of the preliminary investigative report, three were closed after a formal hearing was held, seven were
closed after the respondent judge vacated office, eleven resulted in
the issuance of a private reprimand, five resulted in recommendations for censure, and four resulted in three recommendations for
removal."2 4
Of the eight recommendations for censure or removal filed by
the Commission in its history, seven have been approved; however,
the Supreme Court declined to remove the respondent judge involved in the Commission's first recommendation for removal and
censured the respondent instead. 2 5
123.
informal
124.
125.

The statistics and analyses presented in this section are the product of
investigation of Commission records by the author and his staff.
Id.
In re Martin, 295 N.C. 291, 245 S.E.2d 766 (1978).
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G. Decisions of the Supreme Court
In the course of its consideration of the eight recommendations for judicial censure or removal, the Supreme Court has established several principles relating to standards of judicial conduct,
definitions of conduct proscribed by Article IV, § 17(2) of the
North Carolina Constitution as well as G.S. § 7A-376, and imposition of a particular disciplinary sanction. In addition, the Court
has had to respond to constitutional, jurisdictional, and procedural
challenges to such proceedings.
The first five recommendations to reach the Supreme Court
from the Commission were strikingly similar in that each involved
charges of ex parte dispositions of criminal cases. The conduct
generally involved disposing of criminal cases out of court without
a hearing and in the absence of the prosecuting district attorney." 6
In each instance the Commission had recommended censure, and
in each instance the Court accepted the Commission's recommendation and censured the respondents for conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute or for both willful misconduct in office and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office
13

into disrepute.

7

The sixth proceeding to reach the Supreme Court from the
Commission again involved charges of various ex parte actions in
both civil and criminal cases. However, it also involved a charge
that the respondent had solicited an arresting officer to testify
falsely as to his presence during the administration of a
breathalyzer test. In light of the more serious nature of this charge,
the Commission had recommended removal.1 " Although the Court
recognized the seriousness of the misconduct involved in the latter
charge, a charge which, if proven, would amount to a finding that
the respondent had suborned perjury and certainly would warrant
the respondent's removal from office, it felt that the evidence did
not clearly and convincingly support the Commission's findings
with regard to this charge.1 2' Thus, since the requisite burden of
126. See In re Hardy, 294 N.C. 90, 240 S.E.2d 367 (1978); In re Nowell, 293
N.C. 235, 237 S.E.2d 246 (1977); In re Stuhl, 292 N.C. 379, 233 S.E.2d 562 (1977);
In re Edens, 290 N.C. 299, 226 S.E.2d 5 (1976); In re Crutchfield, 289 N.C. 597,
223 S.E.2d 822 (1975).
127. Id.
128. In re Martin, 295 N.C. 291, 245 S.E.2d 766 (1978).
129. Id. at 306, 308, 245 S.E.2d at 775, 776.
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol4/iss1/1

28

Clark: The Discipline and Removal of Judges in North Carolina

19811

DISCIPLINE AND REMOVAL

proof established in In re NoweU 8 had been met only with regard
to the charges dealing with ex parte actions and apparently show'1
ing some recognition for the respondent's lack of legal training,
the Court declined to remove the respondent and censured him
instead.1 82

1. Interpretationsof the Misconduct Provisions.
From the outset the Court has had to determine whether the
conduct involved in each case and proven by clear and convincing
evidence has constituted one of the grounds requisite to the censure or removal it has imposed in each case. In so doing, the Court
has defined and distinguished between conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute and willful misconduct in office.
Conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that
brings the judicial office into disrepute has been defined as conduct
by a judge which is undertaken in good faith but to an objective
observer appears to be unjudicial and prejudicial to public esteem
for the judicial office.1 8 3 The fact that a judge receives no benefit,

financial or otherwise, from the conduct in question is irrelevant,
and "[w]hether the conduct of a judge may be characterized as
prejudicial to the administration of justice . . . depends not so

much upon the judge's motives but more on the conduct itself, the
results thereof, and the impact such conduct might reasonably
have upon knowledgeable observers."" The test then seems to be
whether the behavior in question would indicate to an objective
observer with full knowledge of the conduct that the judge's ability
to carry out the responsibilities of the office impartially has been
impaired.
Willful misconduct has been defined as:
[TIhe improper or wrongful use of the power of his office by a
judge acting intentionally, or with gross unconcern for his conduct, and generally in bad faith. It involves more than an error of
judgment or a mere lack of diligence. Necessarily, the term would
encompass conduct involving moral turpitude, dishonesty, or corruption, and also any knowing misuse of the office, whatever the
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

293 N.C. 235, 237 S.E.2d 246 (1977).
In re Martin, 295 N.C. 291, 306, 245 S.E.2d 766, 775 (1978).
Id. at 308, 245 S.E2d at 776.
In re Edens, 290 N.C. 299, 305, 226 S.E.2d 5, 9 (1976).,
In re Crutchfield, 289 N.C. 597, 603, 223 S.E.2d 822, 826 (1975).
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motive. However, these elements are not necessary to a finding of
bad faith. A specific intent to use the powers of the judicial office
to accomplish a purpose which the judge knew or should have
known was beyond the legitimate exercise of his authority constitutes bad faith ....
Willful misconduct in office of necessity is conduct prejudicial to the administrationof justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute. However, a judge may also, through negligence or ignorance not amounting to bad faith, behave in a
manner prejudicial to the administration of justice so as to bring
the judicial office into disrepute.. . . Likewise, a judge may also
commit indiscretions, or worse, in his private life which nonetheless brings the judicial office into disrepute.""
In applying these definitions to the conduct involved in all of
the recommendations which have been reviewed by the Supreme
Court, the Court has emphasized that:
[C]onsideration should be given to the traditions, heritage, and
generally recognized practices of the courts and the legal profession, the common and statutory law, codes of judicial conduct,
and traditional notions of judicial ethics. While not necessarily
determinative these may be usefully consulted to give meaning to
the constitutional and statutory prohibitions.'"
2.

The Judicial Code

The Court and the Commission itself have continually consulted the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct,18 7 to give
meaning to the standards of the N. C. Const. art. IV, § 17(2) and
G.S. § 7A-376. 1 " This code, promulgated by the Supreme Court in
1973 pursuant to authority granted by the Legislature,'
generally
recognizes that a judge's attention should be devoted primarily to
the diligent and impartial performance of his judicial tasks, and in
so doing, a judge should be circumspect in his extrajudicial or
quasi-judicial activities in order to avoid even the appearance of
impropriety.
One particular provision of the N. C. Code of Judicial Conduct
has figured prominently in all of the proceedings concerning judges
135. In re Nowell, 293 N.C. 235, 248-49, 237 S.E.2d 246, 255 (1977).
136. In re Edens, 290 N.C. 299, 306, 226 S.E.2d 5, 9 (1976).
137. N.C. CoDE op JurcIcL

CoNDucT, 283 N.C. 771 (1973), 286 N.C. 729

(1975), 289 N.C. 733 (1976).
138. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-376 (1971).
139. Id. § 7A-10.1 (1973).
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol4/iss1/1
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to date. In each of the first six proceedings which resulted in the
censure of the respondent judges involved, the Supreme Court repeatedly indicated that the conduct of each judge violated Canon
3A(4) of the Code which provides in part that:
A JUDGE SHOULD ACCORD TO EVERY PERSON WHO IS
LEGALLY INTERESTED IN A PROCEEDING, OR HIS LAWYER, FULL RIGHT TO BE HEARD ACCORDING TO LAW,
AND EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY LAW, NEITHER INITIATE NOR CONSIDER EX PARTE OR OTHER COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING
A PENDING OR IMPENDING
140
PROCEEDING.

In so doing, the Court has made it clear that a "criminal prosecution is an adversary proceeding in which the prosecuting attorney
and defendant or his counsel are entitled to be present and be
heard."141 Furthermore, disposition of any criminal case is the public's concern and should be done in open court;"14 and disposition
of any case for reasons other than an honest appraisal of the law
and the facts as disclosed by evidence presented in an adversary
setting will constitute
conduct prejudicial to the proper adminis14
tration of justice.
3.

Standards for Censure and Removal

Once the Supreme Court has determined that the Commission's findings of fact are supported by clear and convincing evidence and that the conduct so found constitutes one of the constitutional and statutory grounds for censure or removal, it must
decide whether the respondent should be censured or removed
from office. In the first six cases to reach the Court, each respondent judge was censured for ex parte actions in cases, conduct
which the Court repeatedly declared to be willful misconduct in
office and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that
brings the judicial office into disrepute. Although the last two recommendations to reach the Court also involved charges relating to
ex parte dispositions or communications in criminal or civil cases,
the conduct involved in each recommendation had aspects which
distinguished it from conduct previously censured and was deter140.
141.
142.
143.

N.C. CODE OF JUDICULh CONDUCr, Canon 3A(4), supra note 137.
In re Stuhl, 292 N.C. 379, 389, 233 S.E.2d 562, 568 (1977).
In re Edens, 290 N.C. 299, 306, 226 S.E.2d 5, 9 (1976).
In re Crutchfield, 289 N.C. 597, 603, 223 S.E.2d 822, 826 (1975).
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mined to warrant the respondent's removal from office. "4
Throughout the first five proceedings the Supreme Court had
declined to adopt any specific standards or guidelines for its decision as to whether a respondent should be censured or removed.
However, it did state in In re Hardy 5 that "in the future the result in each case will be decided upon its own facts."14 6 There the

Court was faced with its fifth instance of a judge recommended for
censure for ex parte dispositions in criminal conduct. After examination of the applicable statutory provisions, 7 the Court held that
it may order the removal of a judge when the Commission has only
recommended censure.14 ' Since the Court concluded that fairness
required it to follow the Commission's recommendation, its opinion with regard to its ability to remove instead of censure really
amounted to dicta, but nonetheless generated the strenuous dissent of three members of the Court.14 Despite the split in the
Court on that point, the opinion at least served as a clear warning
to judges.
Again declining to set specific guidelines for its decision
whether to censure or remove, the Court did provide general guidance on this question in In re Martin.154
[W]here a judge's misconduct involves personal financial gain,
moral turpitude or corruption, he should be removed from office.
Further, if a judge knowingly and wilfully persists in indiscretions
and misconduct which this Court has declared to be, or which
under the circumstances he should know to be, acts which constitute wilful misconduct in office and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings the judicial office into disrepute, he should be removed from office. Unquestionably, any act
by a judge or justice which is prejudicial to the administration of
justice and brings the judicial office into disrepute warrants
censure.11
Then in In re Peoples'" Chief Justice Sharp, speaking for the
144.
U.S. 929
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

See In re Peoples, 296 N.C. 109, 250 S.E.2d 890 (1978), cert. denied, 442
(1979); In re Martin, 302 N.C. 299, 275 S.E.2d 412 (1981).
294 N.C. 90, 240 S.E.2d 367 (1978).
Id. at 98, 240 S.E.2d at 373.
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-376 and -377(a) (1971).
In re Hardy, 294 N.C. 90, 97-98, 240 S.E.2d 367, 372-73 (1978).
Id. at 98, 240 S.E.2d at 373 (dissenting opinion).
295 N.C. 291, 245, S.E.2d 766 (1978).
Id. at 305-06, 245 S.E.2d at 775.
296 N.C. 109, 250 S.E.2d 890 (1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 929 (1979).
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Court, distinguished between conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice and willful misconduct in office. The Chief Justice stated that since the former is not per se as serious as willful
misconduct, unless it is knowingly and persistently repeated, a
judge should be removed from office only for willful misconduct in
office.158 Applying this standard to the conduct involved in Peoples, the Court held that the "repeated and purposeful misconduct
and persistent indiscretions constitute[d] wilful misconduct in office and require[d] that [Judge Peoples] be officially removed from
office."'" There Judge Peoples had engaged in a course of conduct
in which ex parte dispositions had occurred over a time span extending as much as seven years and had involved numerous cases.
In addition, there was evidence that the respondent had received
money from defendants for costs and fines, had failed to apply it
for the purpose intended, and had failed or been negligent in returning it to the defendants. This practice was strongly condemned
by the Court and defined as constituting willful misconduct in office and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that
brings the judicial office into disrepute.'"
The last recommendation to be filed by the Commission with
the Supreme Court also involved ex parte actions in a pending
criminal case.'" In this instance, however, the respondent's course
of conduct consisted of numerous ex parte communications with
one female criminal defendant who had appeared before him, culminating in a meeting at night initiated by the respondent during
which he made sexual advances toward her. The judge also made
attempts to obtain sexual favors from a second female defendant
who had appeared before him and was involved in matters subject
to further action by the court. In addition to findings concerning
these instances, the recommendation included a finding relating to
respondent's presiding over a session of court at which his own
traffic case was disposed. 5 7
.For his conduct in failing to recuse himself in proceedings concerning his own case, the Commission recommended that Judge
Martin be censured. For his sexual advances toward the two female defendants, the Commission recommended the respondent's
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. at 157-58, 250 S.E.2d at 918.
Id. at 158, 250 S.E.2d at 919.
Id. at 156, 250 S.E.2d at 917.
In re Martin, 302 N.C. 299, 275 S.E.2d 412 (1981).
Id.
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removal. The Commission's findings and recommendation for censure was adopted by the Court without reaching the question of
whether such conduct alone would amount to willful misconduct in
light of his earlier censure by the Court.5'' In adopting the Commission's findings with regard to the respondent's conduct in relation to the two female defendants and accepting its recommendation for removal, the Court rejected respondent's argument that
such conduct was completely unrelated to his judicial office and
therefore did not constitute willful misconduct in office. First, it
found that the respondent had "pursued a course of conduct which
reflects at least a reckless disregard for the standards of his office";1 8 ' second, it referred to evidence in the record that the respondent intended some exchange of favors with these women;
finally, it noted its previous censure of the respondent.1 60 Thus, by
applying the standards expressed in Peoples, the Court decided
that removal was warranted because the respondent's conduct constituted willful misconduct in office on its face and because it represented the respondent's "persistence in following a course of conduct detrimental to the judicial office.

11

61

Through its decisions regarding recommendations of the Commission, the Court has provided guidance as to what actions constitute improper judicial conduct and under what circumstances a
judge might expect to be censured or removed from office for such
conduct. At the same time, the Court has had to confront procedural, jurisdictional, and constitutional challenges to Article 30 of
Chapter 7A of the General Statutes.1 ' s In each instance, such challenges have been resolved in favor of upholding the soundness and
validity of the proceedings under the statutory provisions.
4. Proceduraland Constitutional Questions.
Procedural questions were raised by the respondent in the second Martin case but were uniformly rejected by the Court. First, it
was alleged that the Commission had violated its own rules of procedure by failing to afford the respondent an opportunity to present relevant matters as provided by Commission Rule 7(b). In rejecting this argument, the Court found no violation and held that
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id. at 311, 275 S.E.2d at
Id. at 316, 275 S.E.2d at
Id. at 31648, 275 S.E.2d
Id. at 318, 275 S.E.2d at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-30

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol4/iss1/1
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even if such a violation had occurred, such a procedural irregularity would not negate the entire proceeding unless the respondent
could show some actual prejudice resulting from the irregularity
since the provisions of Rule 7(b) go beyond the requirements of
due process."' The Court also rejected the respondent's contention
that the Commission's appointment of a fulltime employee of The
North Carolina State Bar as special counsel violated the provisions
of G.S. § 7A-377(b). 1 ' In construing the language of the statute in
question, the Court construed the word "employ" to mean "Use" or
"make use of" since respondent's narrower definition would defeat
the Legislature's intent to provide the Commission with adequate
powers to enable the Commission to effectively carry out its
responsibilities.1 65
Both the second Martin case and the Peoples case have raised
jurisdictional issues. In the second Martin case, the respondent asserted, without citing any authority, that since his conduct with
one of the female defendants occurred in a previous term of office,
he could not be subjected to proceedings before the Commission on
the basis of such conduct. In overruling this exception, the Court
noted that North Carolina's Constitution and statutes provide for
disqualification from holding further judicial office as a consequence of removal and that the conduct in question was not public
knowledge at the time of respondent's re-election. The existence of
these factors distinguished the respondent's case from those lines
of authority which might otherwise have supported his contention
and influenced the Court to uphold the Commission's consideration of evidence relating to the conduct.'" However, even if the
Court had held in the respondent's favor on this point, it appears
the ultimate result would have remained unchanged in light of the
other incidents of misconduct contained in the Commission's recommendations and supported by clear and convincing evidence.
Of greater substance and import was the jurisdictional issue
raised in In re Peoples.1 67 There the respondent, after being notified of the preliminary investigation initiated by the Commission,
tendered his letter of resignation as a district court judge to the
Governor who accepted it with an effective date of I February
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

302 N.C. 299, 308, 275 S.E.2d 412, 416 (1981).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-377(b) (1971).
302 N.C. 299, 310, 275 S.E.2d 412, 417 (1981).
Id. at 318-19, 275 S.E.2d at 422-23.
296 N.C. 109, 250 S.E.2d 890 (1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 929 (1979).
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1978. On 30 January 1978, two days prior to the effective date of
Judge Peoples' resignation, the respondent was served with the notice of formal proceedings instituted by the Commission and the
formal complaint specifying the charges against him. Thus, the circumstances involved presented the question of whether the Commission had jurisdiction to proceed against a judge who had vacated office and, if so, whether the proceedings were rendered moot
by Judge Peoples' resignation. In upholding the validity of the proceedings, the Court initially determined that the proceedings
against Judge Peoples commenced with filing of the formal complaint and service of the notice of formal proceedings and complaint on him and that the Commission's jurisdiction attached at
that point, a point which occurred at a time when the respondent
was still a district court judge.'" Furthermore, the Commission
and the Court retained jurisdiction because once jurisdiction attached, it was not ousted by the respondent's resignation, but continued throughout the course of proceedings under G.S. § 7A-375,
et seq., which would not be concluded until the Court made its
final order. 16" Finally, since G.S. § 7A-376 idiposes sanctions
against a judge in addition to removal, the respondent's resigna17
tion from office did not render the proceedings moot.
Perhaps most significant are the Supreme Court's determinations with respect to the constitutionality of disciplinary proceedings under the Commission system. Fortunately, favorable decisions on constitutional questions raised in other jurisdictions with
similar procedures have been available to guide the Court in its
decisions on such issues.
1 71
Surprisingly, in In re Crutchfield,
the first recommendation
to reach the Supreme Court from the Commission, the respondent
did not raise any constitutional objections to Commission proceedings under the applicable statutory authority. However, Justice
Lake did raise several due process and equal protection -issues in
his dissent in Crutchfield and concluded that the constitutional
deficiencies of Article 30 of Chapter 7A of the General Statutes
rendered proceedings thereunder a nullity.17 3 He questioned without discussion the propriety of the Legislature's enactment of stat168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id. at 144-45, 250 S.E.2d
Id. at 146-47, 250 S.E.2d
Id. at 150, 250 S.E.2d at
289 N.C. 597, 223 S.E.2d
Id. at 605, 223 S.E.2d at

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol4/iss1/1

at 910.
at 911-12.
914.
822 (1975).
827 (dissenting opinion).
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utory provisions relating to the Commission prior to ratification of
the amendment to N. C. Const. art. IV, § 17;' he argued that the
equal protection guarantees of Article I, § 19 of the Constitution of
North Carolina and the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States were violated by the broad discretion
vested in the Commission to determine what sanction to recommend; ' and he asserted that the due process protections of Article I, § 19 of the Constitution of North Carolina and the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States were
violated by the confidentiality of the Commission's proceedings,
the combination of investigative, prosecutorial, and fact-finding
functions in the Commission, the unlimited authority vested in the
Commission to prescribe its own rules of procedure, and the vagueof
ness of the phrase "conduct prejudicial to the administration
75
justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute.'1
The majority opinion in Crutchfield was unresponsive to Jus7
tice Lake's concerns, however, and it was not until In re Nowell'
that such challenges were raised and argued by a respondent and
addressed by the Court. In rejecting each of the respondent's challenges and upholding the constitutionality of Commission proceedings, the Court established the following principles:
The enactment of Article 30 of Chapter 7A of the General
Statutes by the legislature prior to ratification of the amendment
to Article IV, § 17 of the Constitution of North Carolina was not
unlawful because it was passed in anticipation of an amendment
was made contingent upon ratiwhich authorized it and its 1effect
77
fication of the amendment.
The legislature's enactment of G.S. 7A-375, et. seq., was not
an unconstitutional delegation of its legislative authority to an
administrative agency, the Judicial Standards Commission, since
only the authority to make factual determinations in applying the
provisions of Article 30 17was delegated to the Commission and
such delegation is lawful. 0
The provisions of Article 30 do not violate equal protection
guarantees because the legislature intended the North Carolina
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id.
Id. at 608, 223 S.E.2d at
Id. at 610-11, 223 S.E.2d
293 N.C. 235, 237 S.E.2d
Id. at 242, 237 S.E.2d at
Id.

829.
at 830-31.
246 (1977).
251.
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Code of Judicial Conduct to provide a guide to the Commission in
applying the statute, and the legislature is not required to establish statutory guidelines for the Commission's exercise of its investigative powers.'"
The combination of investigative and judicial functions
within the Commission does not violate due process because the
Commission can only recommend censure or removal, and it is
the Court which actually imposes any sanctions. 180
The phrases "wilful misconduct in office" and "conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings the judicial
office into disrepute" are not unconstitutionally vague.181

Another constitutional question was raised by the respondent
in In re Martin.1 2 There it was argued that the Supreme Court
was without original jurisdiction to censure or remove the respondent because the jurisdiction of the Court as defined by Article IV,
§ 12 of the Constitution of North Carolina was not expressly expanded by the amendment to Article IV, § 17 thereof. The Court
held, however, that although Article IV, § 17(2) of the Constitution
of North Carolina "does not expressly authorize the Legislature to
confer original jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court over the censure and removal of judges, [b]y clear implication, it grants to the
Legislature [such authority]."1 8 The Court also pointed out that
ratification of the amendment was done with knowledge that it
would make effective legislation granting jurisdiction to the Court
not elsewhere authorized and that the Court's exercise of such jurisdiction did not violate the separation of powers doctrine.'"
Finally, the Court rejected constitutional challenges raised in
In re Peoples'6 to the provisions of G.S. § 7A-376'" which impose
the sanctions of disqualification from holding further judicial office
and loss of retirement benefits as consequences of removal for
other than mental or physical incapacity. The Court held that in
imposing the sanction of loss of retirement benefits, the legislature
acted within its authority to provide by law for the retirement of
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id. at 242-44, 237 S.E.2d at 251-52.
Id. at 244, 237 S.E.2d at 252.
Id. at 245, 237 S.E.2d at 251.
295 N.C. 291, 245 S.E.2d 766 (1978).
Id. at 299, 245 S.E.2d at 771.
Id. at 300, 245 S.E.2d at 771-72.
296 N.C. 109, 250 S.E.2d 890 (1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 929 (1979).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-376 (1971).
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judges granted by Article IV, § 8 of the Constitution of North Carolina.' 87 In upholding the sanction of disqualification from holding
further judicial office, the Court followed two lines of reasoning:
1) Article IV, § 17(2) of the Constitution of North Carolina
was intended to provide a workable alternative to the cumbersome and inefficient impeachment and address provisions of the
constitution and not to provide an alternative to the remedies of
those provisions which include disqualification from office in the
case of impeachment. Because the statute construing the amendment was conceived and enacted by the same legislature that proposed the amendment, the legislature must have believed the disqualification provisions of G.S. § 7A-376 were authorized by the
amendment. ' u
2) An adjudication of "wilful misconduct in office" under
G.S. § 7A-376 is equivalent to an adjudication of "malpractice in
any office" under Article VI, § 8 of the Constitution of North Carolina and, therefore, can be similarly sanctioned, i.e., by disqualification from office.'"
V.

CONCLUSION

Proceedings under North Carolina's judicial disciplinary system as embodied in the Judicial Standards Commission have withstood various challenges to their validity. This in turn reflects favorably on the soundness of the system and its success in holding
judges accountable for misconduct or for impaired performance of
their duties and in meeting the objective of maintaining public
confidence in the judiciary.
A judge must be honest and independent. This essential independence of the judiciary should not be jeopardized or compromised by the need to hold judges accountable for their misconduct.
The Commission has the difficult and delicate task of weighing and
balancing these two competing and interdependent goals. Inevitably, there arises the question of whether the Judicial Standards
Commission has performed its balancing act successfully.
Answering in the negative are the judges who have been reprimanded, censured, or removed; those who have been subjected to
investigation but feel there was no probable cause for doing so; the
complainants irritated by a judge's decision and who have had
187. 296 N.C. 109, 161, 250 S.E.2d 890, 920 (1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 929
(1979).
188. Id. at 161-64, 250 S.E.2d at 920-21.
189. Id. at 164-66, 250 S.E.2d at 921-23.
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their charges dismissed; the news media who find it much easier to
criticize the Commission for confidentiality than to seek relaxation
by the Legislature of the law; and the many who are convinced
that the Commission is a biased bureaucratic body that is incapable of effectively policing the judiciary. On the other hand, since
those who have served on the Commission should recuse themselves, those answering in the affirmative, if any, are unknown.
Nevertheless, it is submitted that the Commission, with a judicial
misconduct umbrella in one hand and a judicial independence umbrella in the other, is still balancing on the tightrope, precariously
but persistently.
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